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GOVERNANCE FOR QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN SMALLHOLDER-BASED 
TROPICAL FOOD CHAINS 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
 
The paper provides a framework that focuses on the linkages between several key 
dimensions of supply chain organization and performance of perishable tropical food 
products. The focus is on the relationship between governance regime and quality 
management. However, two other but related variables are taken into account because 
they impact on the relationship between governance and quality management. These 
variables are channel choice and value added distribution in the supply chain.  
 
Governance regime is reflecting how to enhance coordination and trust amongst supply 
chain partners and how to reduce transaction costs. Quality management is dealing with 
how to manage food technology processes such that required quality levels can be 
improved and variability in quality of natural products can be exploited. Governance 
regimes in relation to quality management practices are discussed to the extent that 
supply chain partners are able, or are enabled, to invest in required quality improve-
ments. Reduction of transaction costs, creation of trust-based networks and proper trade-
offs between direct and future gains may offer substantial contributions to effective 
quality management and enforcement.  
 
This framework has been applied to nine case studies on smallholder-based food supply 
chains originating from developing countries (Ruben et al., 2007). Three of these case 
studies are discussed in this paper to illustrate what challenges can be derived from the 
case studies. The selected case studies concern fish originating from Kenya, mango 
originating from Costa Rica and vegetables produced in China.  
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1. Introduction         
 
The article has supply chains of vulnerable, mostly perishable, tropical food products in 
mind with smallholders as primary producers. Relevant products are, for example, fruit, 
vegetables, fish, dairy and meat. Smallholders tend to be the weakest party in the supply 
chain due to the distance to markets, asymmetric quality and price information and lack 
of joint action. They are, consequently, very dependent on the structure and 
performance of the supply chain for the part of the value added that they receive. The 
products that they grow, catch, or collect are highly heterogeneous by nature and these 
can be delivered to national or international market outlets. Common features of 
smallholder-based agro-food supply chains of tropical food products are: 
• Scattered production by many smallholder producers; 
• Large irregularities in supply because production is subject to weather and 
climate conditions; 
• High variability in quality attributes; 
• Thin local markets because of limited supply with oligopsonistic demand; 
• High transaction and handling costs related to long distances between 
producers and consumers and problems with the quality of the infrastructure; 
• Limited collective action; 
• Deficient public regulation. 
These characteristics justify a specific treatment of vulnerable products. 
 
This article provides a theoretical framework, applied to case study results, that focuses 
on linkages between governance regime and quality management in smallholder-based 
supply chains of vulnerable tropical food products. Two factors that are closely related 
to this central link are channel choice and value added distribution.  
Leading questions of the study are: 
a. What are the market requirements with respect to quality? This requires 
quality management practices in the supply chain. 
b. How can the final customer be reached in an optimal way? This is the aspect 
of channel choice. 
c. How to enhance coordination and trust amongst supply chain partners and to 
reduce transaction costs? This deals with channel coordination or governance 
regime. 
d. Is each partner in the chain properly compensated? This implies an analysis 
of value added in the chain and its distribution. 
Reduction of transaction costs, creation of trust in networks and sharing of risk might 
offer substantial options for overcoming bottlenecks in the supply chain. This can also 
be helpful in finding techno-managerial solutions for improving both quality levels and 
value added.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The research framework is discussed in section 2. 
The demand for quality in the supply chain is discussed in section 3. Sections 4-6 
discuss elements of the framework. Several case study examples are presented in section 
7, whereas the challenges that can be derived from these case studies on international 
tropical food chains are discussed in section 8. 
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2. The framework 
 
This article provides a theoretical framework, applied to case study results, that focus on 
the linkages between two key dimensions of supply chain organization of vulnerable 
tropical food products, namely governance regime and quality management. 
Governance regime focuses on how to enhance coordination and trust amongst supply 
chain partners and how to reduce transaction costs. Quality management focuses on how 
to manage food technology processes to enhance required quality levels and/or to 
exploit quality variability. Two factors that are closely related to this central link are 
channel choice and value added distribution. Channel choice deals with how to reach the 
final customer with the corresponding quality requirements in an optimal way. Value 
added distribution concerns how to guarantee an acceptable remuneration to the various 
supply chain partners corresponding to their contributions and efforts. 
 
Channel choice, governance regime, quality performance and value added distribution 
are assumed to be critical interfaces in supply chain organisation. The discussion in this 
paper is structured around these four dimensions and follows, where possible, the 
interfaces as illustrated in Table 1. The interaction matrix reflects ‘meeting points’ of 
technical, institutional and socio-economic aspects of supply chain organisation. The 
table will help to detect instruments or strategies that can be helpful to enhance potential 
supply chain synergies or to overcome possible trade-offs. 
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Table 1: Critical interfaces between supply chain dimensions 
 
Performance is influenced by:  
Channel Choice
 
          1. 
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4. 
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     1. 
 
 
X 
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          1 
Sorting & 
delivery 
contracts 
1 
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     2. 
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          8 
 
 
X 
 
 
Quality 
enforcement; 
Monitoring, 
control & 
sanctions 
         11 
Market 
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          2 
Quality 
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      3. 
Subcontracting 
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integral quality 
control 
1 
Quality  
Assurance & 
certification 
 
         7 
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Economies of 
scale & scope;
Location 
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H
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ct
 o
n:
 
Value added 
Distribution 
 
      4. 
 
Market 
competition & 
Dedicated 
suppliers 
1 
Bargaining 
opportunities 
& power 
relations 
         5 
Co-
innovation & 
co-operation 
 
         2 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
Source: Ruben et al. (2007), p. 15. The numbers included in the Table reflect the number of times that the relationship 
is discussed in Section 7. 
 
This framework has been applied to nine case studies about smallholder based food 
supply chains that originate from developing countries (Ruben et al., 2007). Three of 
these case studies have been selected for this article and will illustrate what challenges 
can be derived from this study.  
 
 
3. Demand for quality in the supply chain 
 
A food supply chain delivers food products to final consumers. Foods provide nutrients 
and energy (i.e., nutritional aspects), they provide sensorial pleasure, they can 
potentially harm consumers (i.e., the food safety aspect), and they can spoil rather easily 
(i.e., shelf life is important). Foods are natural products from biological origin, or they 
are made of natural ingredients. This implies that they are subject to biological variation 
that is not fully controllable. Furthermore, they are subject to change, either 
intentionally by processing or unintentionally by uncontrollable outside events on their 
way from primary production to final use by the consumer.  
 
Different chain actors may have a different interpretation of the concept of quality. 
Ultimately, the goal should be that the end-user, i.e. the consumer, is satisfied, but this is 
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too simple a statement. For instance, pest-resistance of vegetables and fruit will not be 
considered to be very important by a consumer, but it is of utmost importance for the 
breeder and the grower. Table 2 lists several meanings of the concept of quality by 
different chain actors. The challenge is to reconcile these interpretations of quality. Co-
operation between members of the supply chain is required to deliver a desired end 
quality, taking into account the needs and constraints of all chain actors involved. 
 
 
Table 2. Interpretation of quality by various chain actors. 
 
Actor Quality aspects
grower vitality of seed, yield
cultivator productivity, uniformity, disease resistance 
auction uniformity, reliability supply, constant quality
distribution shelf life, availability, sensitivity to damage
retailer shelf life, diversity, exterior , little waste
consumer taste, healthy, perishable, convenience
constant quality  
  Source: Ruben et al. (2007), p. 30 
 
 
The intrinsic, and to some extent also extrinsic, quality attributes are determined by 
certain critical control points (CCPs) at various stages in the supply chain. These CCPs 
are different for each commodity. For instance, for certain tropical fruits the temperature 
should not decrease below a critical temperature to avoid chill injury, whereas for milk 
products it is just the other way around: above a certain critical temperature the shelf life 
and safety of the product are in danger. Critical control points can be influenced by 
technological measures such as temperature control as well as by organizational 
measures that guide human behaviour. It is for this reason that quality performance is 
strongly influenced by channel choice, governance regime, and the distribution of value 
added, and vice versa. 
 
The key question related to channel choice of perishable products is about how to reach 
the final customer with the best quality characteristics. Quality performance is directly 
linked to the choice of actors that make up a food chain. Channel choice thus offers 
opportunities as well as limitations for improving quality management. 
Different types of consumers may be addressed through specific marketing channels, 
e.g. convenience shops, supermarkets or open markets. Adequate sorting of products 
can be helpful to tailor product categories towards specific consumer wants.  
The selection of a certain delivery channel has a stronger effect on quality performance 
if the activities in the channel have a noticeable impact on the intrinsic product quality 
attributes. For instance, if a product is very sensitive to the time that it is stored at a 
certain temperature, then the residence time becomes critical, as well as the ability of a 
channel to control temperature. Optimal channel choice thus essentially depends on the 
ability of a channel to invoke certain required actions for good quality performance. 
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4. Channel choice and governance regime 
 
Supply chains or marketing channels represent a process in which a product or service is 
made available for use or final consumption. Channel decisions require a broad view 
about how channel actors bridge the gap between supply and - sometimes distant - 
demand. Channel decisions regarding “long” channels tend to be taken by a channel 
leader or a lead firm with the aim to serve the customers better than in case of producing 
for anonymous (spot) markets. In this respect, a channel decision process implies 
planning to select the (mix of) proper channel(s) that will give an optimal result for the 
total channel or its leader.  
 
Several “prototypes” of supply chains or marketing channels are distinguished in the 
literature (e.g. Gereffi, 2003). Stern et al. (1996) consider 4 major types: 
1. Conventional marketing channels (CMC) "consist of isolated and autonomous 
units or stages, each of which performs a traditionally defined set of 
marketing functions. Co-ordination among channel members is primarily 
achieved through bargaining and negotiation at spot markets." 
2. Vertical marketing channels or systems (VMS) "consist of networks designed to 
achieve technological, managerial and promotional economies through the 
integration, co-ordination, and synchronisation of marketing flows from 
points of production to points of ultimate use." Main types of vertical 
marketing systems are: 
• Voluntary co-operation or co-ordination by joint planning 
• Contractual co-operation 
• Corporate ownership  
3. Networks of agents based on trust, e.g. among relatives, or people belonging to 
the same ethnic group.  
4. Hybrid forms of governance. 
 
We distinguish perishables (e.g. fruits and vegetables, roots and tubers, fish) from 
“non”-perishables which can be stored for quite a long time when properly treated in 
terms of moisture content and storage conditions (e.g. cereals, beans). The more 
perishable a product is, and the more uncertain or risky the environment of the supply 
chain is, the more “central” governance tend to be needed in the supply chain to 
guarantee that channel objectives of  all channel partners and stakeholders are attained.  
 
Modern market-oriented supply chains tend to become shorter as intermediaries 
between producers and parties downstream in the chain become superfluous because of 
the emergence of direct trading relationships between large producers (or producer 
groups) and downstream parties. An example is the transformation of export-oriented 
producers to producer-exporters in some countries to lower transaction costs and exert 
full control over the supply chain. Inter-company relationships in these chains are often 
guided by (transaction-specific) investments such as cold stores, seeds, pesticides or 
credit to decrease delivery uncertainty and increase quality and quality consistency of 
deliveries.  
 
With increasing globalization, the physical distance between producers and consumers 
of food products tends to increase which implies that actors at both ends of the chain, 
smallholders and consumers, are not easily aware of each others needs, opportunities 
and constraints. Consumers might or might not be aware of the conditions under which 
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smallholders have to work and producers may not understand the legitimate concerns of 
(segments of) consumers about their wishes with respect to food safety, food quality and 
sustainable resource use. Food quality and safety concerns may bother various classes of 
stakeholders, e.g. buyers, suppliers and food-related institutions. Sustainability may 
refer to land degradation, pollution of the environment, reduction of biodiversity and 
social responsibility issues (e.g. abuse of the labour force or child labour). These 
concerns can be addressed by the development of institutions or governance systems 
such as chain or corporate social responsibility (CSR) which is generally represented by 
the triple P (people, planet and profit). For example, Dolan and Humphrey (2000) 
discuss such an approach: “The need for governance is reinforced in certain markets by 
increased concerns about labour, environmental (sustainability) and/or product safety 
standards, either through legal regulations or stakeholder (e.g. consumer, government 
and NGO) pressures”. 
 
5. Quality performance and governance regime  
 
Since the 1990s, Western retailers have defined various standards for the production and 
processing of food, such as British Retail Consortium (BRC), EUREP-GAP, SQF. 
Major aims of private food safety standards are (Vellema and Boselie, 2003): 
- to improve supplier standards and consistency, and avoid product failure; 
- to eliminate multiple audits of food suppliers-manufacturers through certification 
of their processes; 
- to support consumer and retailer objectives by ‘’translating’’ their demands 
through the chain;  
- To provide concise information to assist with a due diligence defence in case of 
food incidents. 
 
These standards are now applied by supermarkets and importers all over the world to 
coordinate supply chain activities and to control food quality and safety. Retailers and 
food industries increasingly demand for certification according to these standards of 
production processes and facilities of producers and processing companies in 
developing countries (Jahn et al., 2004). The high costs of certification and further 
differentiation of quality and safety standards by (Western) retailers and food industries 
in recent years result in strengthening vertical relationships in food chains. This is one 
of the major rationales for the increasing competition between (international) food 
chains in stead of competition at company level.  
 
For many smallholders in developing countries it is difficult to comply with these 
quality standards (Vellema and Boselie, 2003; Giovannucci & Reardon, 2001). Small 
producers are in most cases excluded from these chains because of high certification 
costs (for producers) and high monitoring costs (for buyers). Professional large-scale 
producers tend to remain in the supply chain after introducing the new certification 
system. However, we observe examples of inclusion of smallholders in modern quality 
schemes, e.g. through cooperative governance forms or through retail or food industry 
programs (e.g. tea production in Kenya for Unilever).  
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Standards tend to be related to corporate social responsibility, quality or sustainability 
issues (e.g. Fafchamps, 2004). For example, eco-labels aim to address issues regarding 
the sustainability of natural resources (e.g. FSC, MSC, SAI), fair trade labels aim to 
address the value-added distribution in the supply chain (e.g. Max Havelaar, Fair Trade, 
Utz Kapeh), food quality labels aim to address consumer concerns in food safety (e.g. 
ISO, HACCP), and brands of food products aim to safeguard a range of consumer 
values including quality, reliability, food safety, texture, taste, etc. (e.g. Chiquita, Dole, 
Douwe Egberts). These institutions tend to consider both consumer and producer 
interests and are expected to play a key role in promoting social responsible behaviour. 
They are particularly relevant for governance systems without (much) channel 
leadership as is the case in the more traditional supply chains where each pair of stages 
in the channel is usually connected by a spot market. 
 
Several instruments can be used to reduce uncertainty and opportunistic behaviour from 
a buyer’s perspective (Hueth and Ethan, 2001): monitoring of supplier processes, input 
control (of suppliers), output quality control and residual claimancy (sanctions). 
Quality and certification schemes lead to increasing control and more integrated 
governance, such as long-term contracts. At the same time they may lower transaction 
costs. Mechanisms like output quality control and residual claimancy are common in 
any food chain. Monitoring of supplier processes and also input control are increasingly 
applied by both Western retailers and large food industries in developing countries. 
These uncertainty-reducing instruments are embedded in the more integrated 
governance mechanisms, such as contracts or vertical integration.  
 
Above-mentioned instruments can be supported by operational management systems. 
Most relevant management systems in the context of food supply chains are quality 
systems and logistics systems, supported by information systems (Lancioni et al., 2000; 
Porter, 2001; Van der Spiegel, 2004). Inter-company quality systems concern 
monitoring of supplier processes and output, tuning of quality systems in the chain 
(harmonization), exchange of quality information (quality requirements, feedback 
information, etc.), and communication of customer demands and complaints to 
suppliers. Quality of food is also strongly dependent on logistics systems in food chains. 
These systems concern exchange of planning data on: harvesting, storage, 
transportation, post-harvest storage and transportation, order-delivery cycle, use of 
information and (tele-) communication technology. New communication technology can 
be used for quality data exchange and improved logistics planning, thereby improving 
the quality of fresh products.  
 
 
6.  Governance regime and value added distribution 
 
The orientation of supply chains towards specific market outlets greatly influences the 
options and strategies for value added (re)distribution. First, the orientation towards 
certain market segments with higher levels of chain control enables upstream agents to 
gain margins in the delivery process. Second, price and non-price incentives offered to 
supply chain agents can be helpful to improve the delivery efficiency for particular 
market outlets. 
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Value added distribution is essentially different in buyer-driven supply chains compared 
to more traditional producer-driven chains (Gereffi, 1994). In the food sector, retailers 
and branded manufacturers play a pivotal role in setting up decentralized production 
networks while preserving for themselves a key role in product development and 
marketing. The subordination of physical production to the sales functions enables 
control over how, when and where production takes place, and how much profit accrues 
to each stage and agent of the supply chain. 
 
The value added share that remains with primary producers is mainly dependent on their 
relationships with downstream partners. Specific investments for guaranteeing reliable 
deliveries and consistent product quality are a stimulus for more exclusive delivery 
arrangements. Otherwise, long-term delivery contracts are required to enable producers 
to invest in quality upgrading under conditions of high risk exposure (Saenz and Ruben, 
2004). Sustainable access to higher value market segments is thus a key condition for 
capturing additional rents. 
 
The common strategy for dealing with variability in quality has been tailoring the 
supply chain towards ‘average’ quality. This might not, however, be the most effective 
approach, since variability can also be strategically exploited through the management 
of quality differences for specific market outlets (Schouten et al., 2004; Heuvelink et al., 
2004). Heterogeneity in product quality can become an opportunity for smallholder 
development if a better match is made between the inherent variability at the supply side 
and demand in different specific market segments. In this way, also sub-standard 
products and waste can be valorised. 
 
Learning and (co-)innovation are nowadays considered as key components for supply 
chain upgrading that adds value to the produce. Under increasing competition, producer 
surpluses are systematically channelled into consumer surpluses, and therefore supply 
chains are involved in a permanent process of re-positioning.  Smallholders can remain 
involved in this process by applying strategies for improving vertical and horizontal 
cooperation and enhancing economies of scale and scope (Kaplinsky, 2000). 
 
The distribution of value added is related to the degree of complexity of transactions 
(uncertainty), the level of coordination between agents (frequency), and the spatial 
fragmentation of delivery networks. Increasing complexities - due to more demanding 
food safety and quality requirements – can be addressed by standardization, but also ask 
for additional insurance to enable the required specific investments (in cooling, 
packaging, etc.). Supermarket requirements for reliable deliveries and permanent shelf 
provision require more stable relationships with preferred suppliers. The same holds true 
for global sourcing strategies based on simultaneous linkages with various suppliers that 
cover particular time windows (e.g. in mango).  
 
Spatial concentration of smallholder producers (e.g. smallholder tea in Kenyan 
highlands) could provide some agglomeration advantages (or cluster effects) that 
facilitate the transmission of entrepreneurial information and save on external costs 
(Rocha, 2004). Location choice of value added activities is, however, only partly 
determined by cost motives (e.g. cheap labour in production countries) and may be 
seriously hindered by higher import tariffs charged on processed commodities. The 
potential competitive advantage of developing countries is strongly influenced by 
progressive tariffs and SPS standards that may reduce local options for adding value. 
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7.  Case study examples 
 
 
We selected three out of nine case studies that pay in particular attention to 
interrelationships between governance regimes and quality performance (Ruben et al., 
2007) to illustrate the framework that was developed in preceding sections. The case 
studies concern mango originating from Costa Rica, vegetables produced in China and 
fish (Nile perch) originating from Kenya. In the text, references (i,j) are made to cells in 
Table 1 about critical interfaces between supply chain dimensions. The number of times 
that a particular relationship is discussed in this section is reflected in the cells of the 
same table. 
 
Mango, Costa Rica, Guillermo Zuniga (Zuniga-Arias and Ruben, 2007) 
 
Producers involved in the mango supply chain in Costa Rica tend to conduct 
transactions at both the export and the local market. They face strategic choices between 
(a) market outlets devoted to exports where quality attributes such as size, sugar content, 
and absence of external and internal damage are key determinants for a successful 
transaction and business relationship, and (b) local markets, where different qualities 
and delivery modes can be accommodated by wholesalers and retailers.  
Market selection (2,4) is hypothesized to be dependent on farm household 
characteristics (4,2), production system, price attributes and the market context such as 
specific contract configurations (3,1) including quality control (2,3), payment mode, 
type of agreement (1,4), volume (3,4) or rejection rate (1,3).  
  
For the export market most of the produce originates from a producers association (4,2) 
delivering to a cooperative, which packs the mango and sells it to the exporter. The 
degree of vertical integration (2,1) is quite advanced: producers deliver on demand of 
the buyer and face relatively high rejection rates, but in compensation they receive 
access to stable market outlets, input and (subsidized) credit, and benefit from lower 
transport and delivery costs (1,2). While deliveries to the export market might be 
attractive if producers can benefit from reduced transport and transaction costs, they 
also incur higher input costs, have to face higher rejection rates and must pay fees for 
certification (3,2). Many producers who were unable to meet the certification 
requirements moved to the local market. 
In the local market, independent producers or groups of producers deliver produce to 
several outlets like wholesalers, local markets and also directly to consumers. This 
includes produce that was rejected by the export market, 
 
Based on a field survey on outlet choice decisions, determinants of market outlet choice 
by farmers were assessed. Structural, institutional and behavioural factors were assumed 
to determine farmers’ choices for a specific market channel orientation. The empirical 
material for the analysis of market outlet choice was derived from a survey among 94 
mango producers in the major production regions of Costa Rica. A statistical analysis, 
with the percentage delivery to the export market as the dependent variable, resulted in 
the following explanatory variables of mango export outlet choice: mango experience 
(+), risk attitude (+, cell 1,2), cultivated area with mango (+) and scale of production in 
number of boxes per week (+, cell 3,4), written agreement (+) and farmer operating in a 
typical mango export production area (+, cell 3,4). 
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Mango producers are price takers. Mango prices are based on the international prices 
provided by importers, especially in the season that the mango export window is open 
for Costa Rica. Sales to traders that visit the farm to buy rejected mangoes is an 
important secondary outlet for mango export producers. These traders tend to buy on 
credit and pay one week later. 
Mango export producers are willing and able to bear more demanding and stricter 
delivery conditions (2,3) than producers for the local market with respect to quality 
standards, written contract, way of payment, higher rejection rates and buyer 
supervision in the plot. Many mango suppliers were not able to meet the exporter’s 
certification requirements (3,2).  
The domestic market is characterised by larger numbers of buyers both at the wholesale 
and retail markets implying more bargaining opportunities for the producers (4,2). 
Buyers do not inspect the fields (2,3) and the spot market transactions at the wholesale 
market and retail markets are simple compared to the more complicated export market 
transactions. For the local market, the producers’ experience and their historical 
knowledge and relationships with the market appeared to be of key importance for 
finding suitable market outlets. 
 
Since price differences between local and export markets were not substantial, other 
market delivery conditions such as guaranteed and stable market access tended to be of 
higher importance. In conclusion, market outlet choice is a complex decision involving 
welfare objectives and risk considerations with respect to price volatility, costs for 
inputs and credit, and supply conditions (rejection rate). Vertical integration (2,1) is 
already advanced in the export market.  
 
 
Vegetables, China, Hualiang Lu (Lu et al., 2007) 
 
In China, which has become a major vegetable producer, increasing consumer concern 
about vegetable quality and safety (3,2) is drawing the attention of stakeholders. The 
case study investigated the effects of Chinese personal relationships, traditionally called 
guanxi networks, on buyer-seller relationships (2,1) and on quality performance in the 
vegetable sector (2,3) by means of a survey among vegetable sellers (smallholder 
farmers) and vegetable buyers (processors, exporters and retailers such as 
supermarkets).  
Hypotheses that were generated in this study are: 
H1: Trust between buyers and sellers will be higher if buyer-seller relationships (cell 
2,1) are supported by guanxi networks. 
H2a,b: Sellers and buyers will invest more in transaction specific assets if buyer-seller 
relationships (2,1) are  
a. Supported by guanxi networks. 
b. Based on trust 
H3: Quality performance (2,3) will be higher if buyer-seller relationships are associated 
with a higher level of transaction-specific investments. 
Data were collected from 167 vegetable sellers and 84 vegetable buyers in the Jiangsu 
Province of P.R. China. Measurement scales were characterised by multiple items. 
 
The hypotheses are generally supported for both the seller and buyer data sets. But 
significant differences were discovered. All participants in vegetable supply chains try 
to achieve customer perceptions by delivering high quality. The perceived vegetable 
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quality satisfaction in Chinese vegetable supply chains is not only closely related to 
buyer-seller characteristics, such as interpersonal trust and transaction specific 
investment, but is also indirectly influenced by guanxi networks. 
 
For vegetable farmers in Jiangsu Province, transaction specific investments significantly 
improved quality performance (2,3), while interpersonal trust with their buyers (2,1) had 
an indirect contribution to quality performance. This implies that the vegetable farmers 
in Jiangsu province would be rewarded if they put more effort into building trust-based 
buyer-seller relationships. The indirect effects of guanxi networks of vegetable farmers 
on quality performance suggest that vegetable farmers in Jiangsu Province can improve 
their marketing performance (quality perspective, cell 3,2) by relying not only on good 
buyer-seller relationships but also on well developed guanxi networks.  
 
For vegetable buyers, on the other hand, guanxi networks also showed an indirect 
contribution to quality performance in vegetable supply chains (2,3). Guanxi networks 
improved trust with vegetable suppliers, but guanxi networks showed limited influence 
(direct or indirect) on transaction specific investments. This implies that companies are 
not simply relying on personal relationships or trust (2,1) but take investment decisions 
based on the overall contribution of the investments to the companies’ development. 
 
In summary, farmers’ guanxi networks positively influence buyer-seller relationships 
regarding the level of interpersonal trust and the level of transaction specific 
investments (4,3). In a trusted buyer-seller relationship, farmers are more willing to 
invest in specific transactional assets. Vegetable quality performance is also closely 
related to specific investments of the buyers. Buyers’ guanxi networks, on the other 
hand, showed no direct effect on transaction specific investment behaviour.  
 
 
Nile perch, Kenya, Emma Kambewa (Kambewa et al., 2007) 
 
Small-scale primary producers participating in international food chains from 
developing economies face considerable challenges to meet quality standards and to 
implement sustainable practices (cell 3,2). The study of the fresh Nile perch fish channel 
from Lake Victoria in Kenya serves to understand how sustainability and coping with 
quality requirements of (distant) customers can be integrated in a suitable governance 
system. What does it mean for public and private policy, if improvement at the primary 
production level is needed, and what could be the intervention points that may need to 
be addressed?  
 
Case study interviews were conducted in eight landing sites. Informants were the Beach 
Management Units (BMUs), fishermen, middlemen and three processing factories. 
BMUs oversee the activities at the landing sites including hygiene, fish handling, 
marketing, security and conflict resolution. 
It is shown that small-scale primary fish producers are caught up in a cobweb of 
challenges ranging from lack of appropriate fish production technologies, market and 
price information asymmetries, ineffective enforcement for sustainable practices and 
welfare demands limiting fishermen’s participation in international supply chains (cells 
3,2 and 4,1). It is argued that these challenges would be addressed if public and/or 
private policy would, among other things, invest to enable fishermen to access modern 
production technologies both for sustainable and quality-enhancing practices (2,3). 
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The study has identified several intervention points that may improve quality assurance (3,2). 
For example, unlike the HACCP, that focuses on potential hazards, lack of proper knowledge 
about fish quality is an important factor to be addressed to improve quality. Lack of proper 
knowledge is reflected by poor handling such as throwing, beating and stepping on fish. The 
study also shows that lack of cooling and storage facilities - essential to keep fish fresh -, the 
type of fishing gears, and the time it takes before the fish is processed are factors that may 
contribute to quality deterioration. Although these factors are not necessarily hazardous, they are 
nonetheless important for quality improvement at primary level. These results imply that 
investment in the quality management facilities such as ice or cold storage facilities in the 
landing sites, or investments in larger boats that can carry ice are needed (2,3). This however 
may require even more structural investments such as electricity that is currently not available in 
the beaches studied. Poor handling practices could be minimised through educating the 
fishermen and middlemen on the effect of poor fish handling on quality. It may also require 
better motivation, for example, better prices for better quality which was not the case. 
 
The results also show that degradation of the fisheries is largely blamed on the use of bad 
fishing gears which is attributed to high prices for the good gears and ineffective and biased 
enforcement (against fishermen) by relevant authorities (2,3). This implies that public 
institutions should improve their effectiveness in enforcing sustainable fishing practices and the 
recommended fishing gears should be made affordable to all fishermen. Therefore, a change in 
the approach on how sustainable practices are enforced is needed. 
Supporting the BMUs may take different forms such as establishing micro-credit schemes to 
enable fishermen registered with BMUs to buy fishing gears at reasonable prices or low interest 
loans. Having better access to fishing gears would mean that fishermen who use bad gears under 
the pretext of high prices or lack of credit facilities would no longer have an excuse. Moreover, 
enabling fishermen to obtain fishing gears through BMUs would enhance their bargaining 
power (4,2) like for prices and other terms of transactions. 
 
The results also show that fishermen’s position in the channel is compromised by lack 
of price information and interlocked fish/credit markets (cells 4,2 and 2,4). Information 
asymmetries especially over price lead to abrupt price changes and conflicts between 
fishermen and middlemen. There is need therefore to create market information systems 
and institutions through which price information could be communicated to the 
fishermen rather than the fish buyers, e.g., by sending daily a sms with current prices to 
subscribed BMU’s or fishermen.  
 
In conclusion, integrating small-scale primary producers into integrated supply chains 
(2,1) faces many challenges. Addressing these challenges would imply that either public 
or private policy or both should invest in the primary stages to enhance the capability of 
fishermen to compete (4,3). That can be achieved through providing them with such 
investments as quality management tools (2,3). They should also invest in making 
recommended fishing gears affordable for the poor fishermen. Above, private and 
public policy should strive to improve the socio-economic environments so that 
fishermen who use survival as an excuse for using destructive fishing should no longer 
have an excuse.  
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8.  Challenges Ahead 
 
The challenges that can be derived from the case studies on international tropical food 
chains are discussed in this section. 
 
Supply chains of vulnerable tropical products are facing multiple challenges in 
terms of market integration and quality upgrading. While economic reforms in 
developing countries may have reduced some binding constraints related to high 
transaction costs and overall competitiveness, still major limitations remain in the 
field of market transparency and trust relationships required to enhance better 
quality compliance and equitable revenue sharing. Several case studies emphasize 
the importance of improving access to information regarding the consumer’s 
demand at different market channels. Dovetailing producers’ interest with market 
demand asks for suitable incentives that satisfy the objectives perceived at both 
sides of the supply chain. Therefore, an integrated appraisal of effective 
governance structures which link stakeholders throughout the chain is considered 
of vital importance. Within the four key areas that have been addressed we 
identify (see also the numbers included in the cells of Table 1) several issues that 
influence the structure and performance of (inter)national supply chains and 
networks of tropical foods and the position of smallholder producers therein. 
 
Linking smallholders to market channels 
 
Market access of smallholders was originally mainly related to limited 
infrastructure and scarce information that resulted in high market entry costs. In 
addition, the high risk related to deliveries to distant markets with – sometimes 
unknown – customers’ preferences imply that high investments are required to 
guarantee competitiveness. Traditional traders played a critical role for providing 
pre-finance as an insurance device within this framework.  
 
With the liberalization of many local markets in developing countries, the 
position of smallholders generally hardly improved, since thin markets tend to 
meet limited agency competition. Moreover, local organisations in charge of 
resource pooling and promoting joint action by farmers experienced serious 
drawbacks. When input provision and credit supply services became privatised, 
the opportunities for innovation and resource use intensification became even 
more constrained.  
 
Under the influence of increased urbanisation, smallholder participation in 
exchange networks is partly recovering through greater reliance on contractual 
deliveries to supermarket chains and (inter)national brokers (e.g. case study on 
Nile perch from Kenya). This implies that farmers should be able to comply with 
new demands regarding product quality and safety and need to maintain stable 
and frequent deliveries. In several markets we notice the emergence of preferred 
supplier relationships based on co-investment in quality upgrading. Elsewhere, 
new market opportunities are created that enable risk diversification (e.g. through 
engagement in future exchange). Finally, new local and regional initiatives for 
smallholder organisation arise in response to market demands... 
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Supply chain governance for enhanced competition 
 
Given the emerging new relationships between smallholders, traders/processors 
and retailers, the internal organisation of supply chain interactions is subject to 
important modifications. New governance regimes are required to guarantee 
stable deliveries of high quality, while providing suitable incentives to all 
stakeholders and complying with established contractual arrangements.  
 
Supply chain governance used to be focussed on establishing coordination 
regimes between supply chain actors mainly for efficiency purposes. In the 
current era of quality competition, other governance functions become 
increasingly important. Supply chain partners adopt common standards and 
certification procedures as an incentive framework that enables specific 
investments in product and process upgrading. This, in turn, asks for collective 
action and farmers’ organisation to control free-riding behaviour. Vertical supply 
chain integration might thus create new demands for strong horizontal 
organisation. 
 
The new governance framework surrounding tropical food chains is based on a 
regime where smallholders and other chain partners engage in contractual 
regulations to enhance their competitive position. Several case studies indicate 
that an active role of the state is required to define minimum standards (at least 
for exports), but also to enhance market transparency to enable smallholder 
participation.  
 
Contracting regimes for quality upgrading 
 
Market competition at outlet level is increasingly determined by delivery 
frequency and quality performance. Where (inter)national trade networks used to 
be shaped by competitive advantage at country or enterprise level, competition is 
nowadays becoming more an issue of successful supply chain integration and 
quality management. 
 
Long-term contracts that include facilities for input provision, credit, and 
implements, enabling upgrading of production systems and product management 
practices, tend to be based on inter-linkages with traders and retailers with market 
access. Better security regarding market outlets and prices are for many 
smallholders a key condition for engaging in quality upgrading. External agents 
can contribute to market transparency in several ways, e.g. by providing 
certification services. 
 
 
Organization for bargaining power and value added sharing 
 
Supply chain integration poses new challenges to collective action, both for 
enhancing economies of scale and scope in production, and for increasing 
bargaining options in market exchange. Traditional reasons for agency 
organization were mainly restricted to the smallholder domain, but these are now 
further extended towards other supply chain partners. This also implies that 
different forms and degrees of coordination – ranging from loose coupling to 
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contracts – receive attention as vehicles for creating dynamic cooperative 
advantages. Supply chain coordination thus provides opportunities for improving 
management and investment intensity as basic pre-conditions for quality 
upgrading. 
 
Successful agency cooperation critically depends on the availability of suitable 
incentives for enhancing investment efforts. Effective enforcement of delivery 
contracts and compliance with product specifications requires reward systems that 
recognize existing interdependencies. In addition, upstream agents may rely on 
group action – through cooperatives and other forms of producer organizations – 
to improve their bargaining power. Value added distribution in tropical fruit 
chains increasingly depends on effective channel coordination. While 
smallholders may have lost part of their traditional comparative advantage 
(mainly based on location), the emergence of new types of delivery relationships 
provides opportunities for creating specific skills and abilities that guarantee 
products with quality-based value added. 
 
Conclusion and agenda for further research 
 
From the cross-sectional appraisal of tropical supply chains four main conclusions 
emerge: 
• Comparative studies of different case studies from a common perspective 
provide the required critical mass for drawing more generic conclusions 
regarding market access, governance and quality management in tropical 
food chains 
• Even if there is no ‘one size fits all’ outcome that arises from the case 
studies,  the nature and character of the interactions at the interfaces 
provide new insights in the options for addressing quality problems 
through interventions in governance; 
• Several studies emphasize the importance of ‘learning by doing’ and the 
requirement of experiments for improving quality management and 
governance regimes; 
• Improving supply chain performance is basically a matter of private sector 
interactions, but there remains certainly room for public involvement in 
standard setting, regulation and enforcement. 
 
This article intends to increase our insights in institutional, technical and socio-
economic factors that influence the performance of tropical supply chains based 
on smallholder production. Further research on supply chain integration and 
management regarding tropical food chains has to face the following main 
challenges: 
• Scientific support for improving the quality performance of tropical food 
chains at different stages of the supply chain will increasingly be based on 
the capacities to develop an integrated and interactive framework. 
Dovetailing technical and socio-economic approaches to tropical chain 
management and governance is therefore required for adequately 
addressing the strategic interfaces;  
• Strategic research focussing on the improvement of supply chain 
integration of tropical food networks asks for new instruments which 
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enable the monitoring and prediction of quality change for particular 
market channels; 
• Supply chain performance analysis from an integrated perspective should 
consider multiple performance indicators to assess the impact of these 
interventions and refer to their potential contributions to increased value 
added, income and employment creation, and risk reduction.  
• Several of the suggested solutions are likely to be based on close 
cooperation between private and public partners, and could be undertaken 
within the framework of public-private partnerships. Consequently, 
potential policy implications of the study, that may require 
experimentation before implementation, are: 
o Access of smallholders to tropical supply chains can be supported 
by reducing entry costs through co-investment and insurance 
mechanisms that enable smallholders to undertake specific 
investments; 
o The establishment of supply chain governance regimes asks for a 
legal and institutional framework that offers equal opportunities to 
stakeholders groups for participation and exchange;  
o With the increasing importance of grades and standards, public 
agencies should assume a leading role in enhancing market 
transparency, creating legal enforcement systems and guaranteeing 
compliance with minimum standards. 
o The creation of dynamic competitive advantages based on supply 
chain cooperation needs to be supported by public research and 
development activities that provide sector-wide assistance to 
product and process upgrading; 
o Improving bargaining options throughout the supply chain asks for 
public support for the establishment and training of local 
leadership and the promotion of community-wide voluntary 
organisations. 
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